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0 Introduction 
One of the prevalent themes in the semantic literature of the last I Syears has. been the 
idea that manrnatural language semantic phenomena involve what have come to be 
known as "tripartite structures". While this was probably most apparent in the domain of 
adverbial (cf. Lewis 1975) or nominal quantification (cf. Barwise and Cooper 1981), the 
idea of partitioning the semantic parts of a sentence into operator, restrictor, and nuclear 
scope (cf. Partee 1991 for a survey) has also been .used in a number, of other semantic 
domains, including modals and conditional sen.tences. On this view, first conceptualized 
in Kratzer 1978, a conditional sentence can be seen as a special kind of modal sentence 
where the if-clause contributes the domain restriction for a quantification over possible 
worlds. The quantificational operator relating the restricted domain and the assertion is 
either given by a modal in the main clause, or implicitly assumed to be that of a universal 
if no modal is present. This general. approach can cover both indicative conditionals as 
well as counterfactual-or as we will call them in this study, subjunctive-conditionals, 
in which the main clause predicate .is in the form of would+ infinitive in English or a 
subjunctive form in German, and the if0 clause in an analogous nonindicative form. Often, 
it is assumed, cf. Heim 1992:218, that (part of) the choice of indicative vs. subjunctive 
conditionals is governed by conditions of use, rather than truth conditions per se. 
However, while quite a considerable amount of effort has been spent on 
characterizing the semantics of subjunctive conditional sentences with overt antecedents 
(if-clauses), relatively little attention has been paid to the particular kinds of problems 
raised by those instances where we find a clause in subjunctive ·mood without an overt 
antecedent present. Given 'the tripartite perspective, this raises the issue of what fills the 
role of restrictor and by what mechanism it gets there. The corresponding questions 
regarding nonovert (modal) operators hardly seem to present much of a problem, as the 
default assumption of a necessity operator straightforwardly presents an answer.' 
Because of this, it may have been thought that the problem of recovering the content of 
• I would like to thank my implicit coauthor Craige Roberts for many discussions and untiring 
encouragement. Her efforts deserve a paper with fewer shortcomings. This work was supponed at various 
stages by NSF Grant No. NBS-9022934. 
1Cf. Portner 1993:34: "The default conversational force is necessity."· 
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nonovert restrictors is equally simple, but as was shown in a number of studies by Walter 
Kasper (I 987, 1992), this is not so. We will take his observations as a starting point for 
our own investigation into the problem. 
1 Kasper's account of Simple Subjunctives 
Kasper 1992, which is based in large part on Kasper 1987, points out that while often, the 
antecedent of a subjunctive conditional can be recovered from context, as in (I) (Kasper 
1992:308), there are also uses of simple subjunctives where the antecedent does not seem 
to be recovered from the context, but rather from the content of the subjunctive clause 
itself. 
(I) Q: What would John do if his wife left him?. 
A:. He would marry his girlfriend. 
Thus, in the following example, Kasper claims that the antecedent of the conditional is 
recoverable from the "preconditions" of the predicate in the main clause, fail the exam, 
resulting in a reconstructed content along the lines given in (2b): (cf. Kasper:309) 
(2) a Your brother Peter wouldn't have failed the exam. 
b. If your brother Peter had taken the exam (in your place), 
[he] wouldn't have failed [it]. 
This meaning arises for instance in a context where Peter's mother utters her 
disappointment toward her son John, who recently failed said exam. What this sentence 
conveys ·is the belief that Peter taking the exam in the place of John would have been 
more successful. As Kasper points out, in such a situation, it is not possible to reconstruct 
the utterance in (2a) as meaning something. like: 
(3) If your brother Peter had had enough sleep, 
· [he] wouldn't have failed the exam. 
One important difference between the sentences in (2b) and (3) is that in (3), there seems 
to be a ·presupposition that Peter in fact failed the exam, whereas if anything, the opposite 
is the case for (2b). Moreover, this appears to contradict the commonly held assumption 
that the use of the subjunctive presupposes falsehood of the indicative counterpart for 
both antecedent and consequent. Thus, while in (3), there does seem to be an 
understanding that Peter indeed did not have enough sleep and that he did fail the exam, 
it is not clear in what way the indicative counterparts of (2a) or of the consequent of (2b) 
could be considered false. Instead, it appears that nonparticipation in an exam renders a 
claim of nonfailure "trivially true." 
This situation reverses itself if we look at the counterparts of (2) and (3) that contain 
the nonnegated versions of the respective consequents:2 
(4) a. Your brother Peter would have failed the exam. 
b. If your brother Peter had taken the exam (in.your place), 
[he] would have failed [it]. 
(5) Ifyour brother Peter had had less sleep, 
[he] would havefailed the exam. 
2 To enhance plausibility, the antecedent in (5) has been changed slightly too. , 
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Here, it appears that the subjunctive indeed carries the presuppositions that one would 
usually expect. Thus, Kasper suggests that in (5), as before, the falsehood of the 
indicative counterpart is presupposed, i.e. that Peter did not fail the exam. B_ut notice that 
the same inference-is now also possible for (4), viz. that Peter did not fail the exam. 
Kasper's conclusions from the facts in (2-4) are twofold: 
I. Subjunctives can be licensed not only by outright falsity of the indicative counterpart, 
but also by means of "preconditions" on the indicative counterpart which are. not met. 
2. While nonnegated simple indicatives carry such preconditions, this is not the case for 
negated simple indicatives. 
Thus, according to Kasper, if Peter never took the exam, a negated sentence like the 
following can nevertheless be felicitously and truthfully uttered: 
· (6) Peter did not fail the exam. 
As a consequence of the statements in I. and 2. above, the asymmetric inference patterns 
for (2) and (4) fall out: (cf. Kasper:312) 
The corresponding simple suhjun~tive then presupposes the falsity of the simple . 
indicative just because the simple subjunctive presupposes the falsity of those 
necessary preconditions. In the case of negated s_imple subjunctives, on the other 
hand, the fact that the preconditions are not satisfied is compatible with the truth of 
the corresponding simple indicative. 
Oni: important issue we need to turn to next is the nature of the preconditions· which 
Kasper assumes to be responsible for licensing subjunctives in those cases where they are 
not satisfied. He does acknowledge that there appears to be a striking similarity between 
this· notion of precondition and that of "presupposition". Thus, for instance, in the 
example in (7a), the definite description gives rise to an existence presupposition, and it 
is precisely the nonfulfillment of this presupposition that can license (one reading of) the 
sentence in (7b), given in (7c): (cf. Kasper:314) 
(1) a. The king of France is (not) bald. 
b.The king of France would (not) be bald. 
c.lf there were a king of France, [he] would (not) be bald. 
However, Kasper stops short of equating his notion of preco·ndition with that of 
presupposition. It is not exactly clear that he has any convincing argument for doing so. 
Rather, it seems that Kasper wants to maintain the distinction mostly on conceptual 
grounds. Thus, he assumes presuppositions to be associated with the linguistic expression 
of an utterance, rather than its propositional meaning, which means, for instance that 
participating in an exam is viewed as a precondition for failing it, but not as a 
presupposition as it is not particularly tied to the linguistic expression Jail an exam. 
At this point, we may wonder whether this division is really grounded in empirical 
fact or rather has to do with an antiquated conception of presupposition as something that 
is intimately linked with a linguistic form.3 For instance, it has been known since at least 
Karttunen 1973 that conditional sentences act as filters for the purposes of presupposition 
projection. That is, whether a presupposition of the consequent is projected to the whole 
sentence depends on the antecedent and its entailments. For example in (8), the 
3 Note, for instance, that any mention of treatments of presuppositions in terms of context change and the 
resulting theory of presupposition projection, as in Heim (1982, 1983, 1992) is conspicuously absent from 
the references. 
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consequent contains a possessive pronoun which will give rise to the presupposition that 
there are indeed instances of the common noun (i,e. children) that "belong to" the 
possessor. Since under normal circumstances, being married bears no necessary impact 
on someone's parental status, the presupposition that Keith has children is projected to 
the whole sentence (cf. Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990). 
(8) If Keith is married to Linda, all of his children are asleep. 
The situation is rather different, however, if the antecedent entails any of the 
presuppositions of the consequent. It has been said that in this case, the presuppositions 
arc "filtered out'". A more adequate way of looking at it may be that the antecedent 
provides a local (as opposed to global) context which already satisfies the presuppositions 
of the consequent. This can be seen in (9), where the whole sentence no longer carries a 
presupposition that Keith is the father to any children. 
(9) If Keith has children, all of his children are asleep. 
What is important is that Kasper's preconditions seem to behave in exactly the same way 
for the purposes of "precondition" projection. Thus, in ( I 0), where the antecedent has no 
bearing on the preconditions of the consequent, the inference that Peter indeed 
participated in the exam survives: 
(10) If Peter didn't study much, he (probably) failed the exam. 
In contrast, if the antecedent (or its entailments) locally satisfies the preconditions, the 
sentence as a whole no longer allows the inference that Peter actually participated in the 
exam: 
( 11) If Peter took the exam, he (probably) failed it. 
If the notion of presupposition as a kind of additional constraint on meaning tied to 
linguistic form, and Kasper's preconditions indeed were distinct (albeit partially 
overlapping) phenomena, this convergence would be coincidental. For all we know, the 
projection behavior of these preconditions could be rather different from that of "first­
class" presuppositions. On the other hand, a rather different picture emerges if one views 
presuppositions in terms of the requirements they impose on context. On such a view, 
advanced by Stalnaker and first explicitly articulated formally in Heim 1983, a 
presupposition of a sentence is an entailment that is shared among all contexts admitting 
that sentence. What triggers such requirements on context is pretty much of secondary 
interest. While it often seems to originate with linguistic form, as, say, for definite 
descriptions, one can think of Kasper's preconditions in terms of requirements that are 
imposed on context by virtue of how the world is viewed to work: i.e. that failing an 
exam necessitates taking it etc. What is important for the purposes of explaining the 
licensing of subjunctives, then. are the requirements on context, or more precisely, that 
some among them not be fulfilled.4 regardless of whether these requirements are 
"presuppositional" in Kasper's narrow use of the term. In our own usage of the term 
presupposition. we will from now on think of it in terms of entailments of contexts . 
admitting a given sentence, following Heim 1983, 1992. Along with the terminology, we 
also adopt the view that strictly speaking, there is no such thing as ''presupposition 
cancellation." Instead, it can be reasonably argued that cases such as (6) that give the 
appearance of presupposition cancellation should be reanalyzed in terms of a different 
role played by the negation here. Specifically, once one considers contexts in which such 
sentences can be felicitously uttered, it becomes clear that they normally exhibit an 
4 Or, given the epistemic state of the speaker 1 that it is deemed unlikely that the state of affairs in question 
holds, cf. Portner 1993:28. 
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element of corrective response which is typical of "metalinguistic" negation, cf. Horn 
1985: 
(6') Q: Did Peter fail the exam? 
A:. Peter did not fail the exam. In fact, he never took it! 
As Horn has shown, the function of metalinguistic negation is to deny the appropriateness 
of a particular utterance based on such diverse aspects as presuppositions or even 
pronunciatiim. Hence, in (6'), the answer can similarly be understood as calling into 
question whether the predicate fail the exam can even felicitously be applied in Peter's 
case as opposed to truthconditiorially negating the proposition 'Peter failed the exam'. If 
the latter were the case, it would be a mystery why the sentence-in A is in fact compatible 
with the truth of 'Peter did not pass the exam'. 
The absence of an explicit recognition of the role of context for the· notion of 
presupposition and the projection problem carries over to the particular proposals· Kasper 
makes to account for simple subjunctives formally in a Discourse Representation Theory 
(DRT) framework (cf. Kamp 1981) based on a Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG) 
syntactic backbone. This is somewhat ,ironic, as DRT -was initially developed as a 
dynamic theory, that is, as one that was supposed to extend the limits of the purely 
sentence-based view of classical Montague Semantics and take into account the influence 
of discourse for instance on possible anaphoric relations. Yet, at least as far as Kasper's· 
usage of DRT goes, one finds little evidence that his dynamic perspective. is thought to 
encompass contextual influence beyond pronominal reference--contrary to the spirit of 
Heim's Context Change Semantics, which is often referred-to as a "twin". of DRT. 
In particular, Kasper proposes to bring presuppositional effects into DRT by letting 
the semantic representation of a linguistic expression correspond to. a pair of discourse 
representation structures (DRSs). The first, textual, DRS represents the truthconditional 
content, and the second, background, DRS encodes conditions which may affect the 
interpretation of the first DRS. For the most part, what a linguistic expression contributes 
in terms of textual and background DRSs will be pretty much alike. However, for 
instance in the case of a -verb such as win-against, the backg_round DRS will contain a 
condition to the effect that in order to win against someone, one has to be the latter's 
opponent (Kasper:325):5 · · · ' 
(12) v(win-against<(tSUBJ)(tOBJ)>) = 
< Iwln(~,, I· -~,, , 
Crucially 'now, the bipartite DRS Kasper proposes for the subjunctive operator is 
sensitive to the· distinction between textual and background DRSs. Thus in (13), the 1..­
expressions6 specify that the first part of a DRS that this operator co111bines with, that is 
the variable over conditions, C, fill the slot of the textual DRS in the resulting 
represention, whiJe the second argument, B, picks up the inform_ation in the background 
DRS and inserts it in all occurrences of this variable (Kasper:325). 
5 While Kasper is not explicit on this point, one hos lo assume that some general principle ensures that the 
semantic roles of the predicates win and opponent are linked to the appropriate grammatical functions, 
SUBJ and OBJ. 
6 The treatment of DRSs as functional objects, i.e. as functions from (pairs ot) DRSs to (pairs ot) DRSs 
allows semantic construction to be reduced to functional application. · 
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(13) · v(subjunctive) = 
,---------, 
., : > 
@ 
As a result, the nonnegated- conditions serve as. tlie antecedent for th·e conditional 
constraint that represents the textual part of the new DRS. At the same time, the re~ulting 
DRS will now have the negated background conditions of it_s argument ,as it~. own 
background conditions. Once the textual DRS has been built up for a sentence, the 
background DRS is then added to it by a process of co'{npatibility restricted 
incrementation (cf. Gazdar's 1979:131 notion.of satisfiable incrementation). This means 
that given a textual DRS K and a background DRS BG, only those conditions of BG are 
added to the resulting textual representation that are compatible with .the other conditions 
of BG .as well as all those of K. In the case of subjunctives, this amounts ,by default to 
adding the entire negated DRS in the background BG in ( 13). As a consequence, ·all 
previous and following conditions must .be compatible with these conditions, which has 
the effect of rendering the antecedent of the conditional counterfactuaJ.7 The result of 
combining the lexical constribution of win-against with that of the subjunctive, yielding 
would win-against, is given in (14), which could be paraphased as something like "x 
would win against y iff x wins against y provided x and y are opponents of each other, 
.and it is part of the backg~und information that x and y are not opponents of each other." 
(14) v(would win-against) = 
< 
oppon.(x,y) 
., :------, > 
·oppon.(x,y) 
On closer inspection, there are a number of aspects of Kasper's approach that are 
questionable. Consider the particular kinds of b_ackgrounds comprising the preconditions 
whose failure gives rise to a licensing of subjunctives. The one example given, namely 
that the verb win-against has a precondition to the effect that those involved in a winning 
event be opponents of each other, is fairly illustrative of what is wrong with this kind of 
. approach. Imagine a situation in which Peter is matched against Boris Becker ("BB") in a 
tennis tournament, but for some rea~on, the two never get to play against ea~h· other (for 
7 As Kasper· himself ~ates (p. 330) as far as th~ treatment of siiople subjunctives is concerned, it appears 
that instead of his compatibility restricted incrementation, simple union of the textual DRS K and the 
background DRS BG, the latter given as the consequent of a conditional with empty antecedent, -would 
suffice, given in (i): 
(i) 
Kul 8 ~no I 
The reason for this _is that there will never be a conflict among conditions as the textual part of a 
subjunctive sentence is given as a complex, conditional DRS, which means that none of the conditions are 
asserted, only the conditional relationship between the two DRSs notated as''=>". 
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instance. because Peter broke his wrist when he fell off the curb at his hotel). It seems 
plausible to regard Peter and BB indeed as opponents of each other. Kasper's theory 
would predict that the following sentence should not be an .acceptable simple subjunctive 
as the preconditions are met by context. However, this example seems perfectly fine if it 
is understood that some other participant played a full match against BB and lost. 
(15} Peter would have won against Boris Becker. 
From this, we may conclude that the preconditions for winning have to be incremented 
by a condition encoding the requirement that the people involved actually played against 
each other. But that won't help much either, for suppose that Peter and BB actuaJly get to 
meet on the tennis court, but the match is never finished because of an injury afflicting 
Peter half-way during the match. In this situation again, a sentence like (15) would be 
predicted to be impossible, even in a· scenario as stated above where others actually 
played and lost against BB. 
The point made by these examples is that there is no principled way to anticipate all 
the preconditions of an actiori that may become relevant for constr;ucting ways in which 
the event in question is prevented from taking place in reality. The problem is 
reminiscient of the approach to word meaning in terms of lexical decomposition foto 
necessary and sufficient conditions. All such efforts are notoriously. fraught. with the 
problem that often there is an inherent vagueness in the interpretation of !;Uch conditions 
and that because of the great deal of situational dependency of what are perceived .to be 
defining features, the whole enterprise is open-ended in principle.8 At the same time;-it is 
· quite clear from Kasper's description that he considers such background information part 
of what is specified as the lexical information associated with verbs· such as· win. 
Another argument against Kasper's explicit encoding of failed preconditions in DRSs 
comes from cross-linguistic considerations. Let us suppose that eligible preconditions for 
licensing subjunctives cannot directly be deduced from the meaning of a given verb, but 
have to be made explicit as the background part of the lexically contributed DRS for a 
given verb. Then it should, at least in principle, be possible for two languages to converge 
on the semantic contribution of the subjunctive .as well as the textual me~ning of a given 
verb, but disagree on whether or not a certain situation licenses the use pf the subjunctive. 
The reason for this is· that there is no guarantee that each language will also ericode 
identical preconditions for the verb in questions .. And of course, with different 
preconditions, the resulting DRSs will be different. as well, specifying. different 
satisfaction conditions. While this is somewhat hard to test empirca!ly (because it i_sn't 
always immediately obvious that the first variable in this equation, i.e. the meaning 
contribution of the subjunctive, is really identical), it seems to be an implausible scenario, 
and certainly is not supported by the situation with regard to English and German. For 
instance, the equivalent of (2a), given as ( 16) below, is virtually synonymous with- the 
English sentence. 
(16) Dein Bruder Peter wiire in der Priifung nicht durchgefallen. 
your brother Peter would.have in the exam not failed 
This would be a coincidental fact in Kasper's theory,'but would necessarily fall'out in any 
account in which the ingredients for the semantics consi_sts of no more than the lexical 
meaning of the words involved, the felicity conditions imposed on context by 
subjunctives, and very general, cross-linguistically valid considerations· of how domain 
restriction works in these cases. 
HThis is also reminiscent of what Kram:r 1989 has to say about one attempt at stating the truth conditions 
of counterfactuals: "Pilosophers like Nelos Goodman [ ... l actually took it upon themselves to try to say 
~xactly what the facts are which have to be taken into account in the evaluation of a counterfactual 
sentence. [ .•.) Goodman eventually reached the conclusion that the additional premises [needed to make the 
consequent follow.logically, AK) don't seem to be specifiable in a non-circular way." 
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2 The role ofintonation and informational structure · 
Another of the more severe shortcomings of the analysis offered by Kasper is the fact that 
he does not establish a connection between the special intonational/information-structural 
properties of the kind of sentences he considers and their meaning. Thus, Kasper notes (p. 
313) that sentences containing simple subjunctives are "often used with contrastive 
stress." What is probably meant by this is that in the sentence in (17a), the subject Peter 
carries the intonational properties of a contrastive topic, which the paraphrase in ( 17b) 
tries t-0 elucidate. 
L*H L (H%) H*L 
(17) a. Peter would have passed that exam. 
b. As for Peter (as opposed to someone else who didn't pass the exam), 
he would have passed the exam · 
As is noted by Partee 1991: 178, the function of contrastive topics is to "present one topic 
am·ong alternative possible topics". Intonationally, such topics are often realized in terms 
of what Jackendoff I972, following Bolinger 1965, refers to as a "B accent", that is, a 
rising 'nuclear tone L *H consisting of a low tone (L *) associated with the stressed syllable 
and a trailing high tone (H) to the following one (cf. Fery 1992:21). Since B accents 
usually constitute their own intermediate phrases, one also finds a low phrase accent (L) 
at the end. 9 Moreover, it seems that especially in slower speech, B-accented constituents 
can form an Intonation phrase (IP) of their own, in which case there is a high boundary 
tone (H%). If we compare the example in (17) with the version in which Peter .does not 
bear a B accent, a noticeable difference in interpretation emerges: 
H*L 
(18) Peter would have passed that exam. 
Unless the context has already established that someone other than Peter failed that exam 
and lhe attention is now shifted to how Peter would have fared in comparison (for 
instance by means·of a ·question like "How about Peter?"), it is essentially impossible to 
get a contrastive interpretation here. Instead, we assume that Peter did not pass his own 
exam in actuality and that under some contextually salient circumstance (such as his 
having had more sleep the night before, cf. (3) above), his fate would have been 
otherwise. · 
As the counterpart of the B accent, we have what Jackendoff calls the "A accent", 
whose intonational implementation is in terms of a falling H*L contour. If a sentence 
contains a B accent, there will also have to be an A accent, but the reverse does not hold, 
as is exemplified by the sole A-accent in (18). Kasper notes that constituents other than 
subjects can also bear contrastive stress, such as the direct object that exam in (19a): 
(19) a.Peter would have passed that exam. 
b. As for that exam (as opposed to another exam which he didn't pass), 
· Peter would have passed it. 
Frequently, B-accented nonsubjects are realized as syntactic topics, as in (20): 
(20) That exam, Peter would have passed. 
9 But see Pery 1992 for argumenlS that intermediate·phrases in Ge~an do not have a phrase accent. 
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Incidentally, German appears to be somewhat more tolerant in the extent that it allows 
constituents in positions other than syntactic topic to be construed as contrastive topics. ID 
Thus, in (24) a contrastive topic is fairly happy to occur in the Mittelfeld. 11 12 
(21) Peter hatte dieses Examen bestanden. 
Peter had-SUBJ this exam passed. 
'This exam, Peter would have passed.' 
The reason why intonational/information-structural properties are important for the 
understanding of subjunctives is that an adequate account should in some way be able to 
elucidate why certain figurations are tied so closely with constraints on interpretation. 
That is, if in the absence of a B accent, the range of antecedents that can be accomodated 
is somewhat limited, cf. (18) above, what is it that the B accent adds so as to allow the 
contrastive interpretation? 
4 Von Fintel 1994 
. One recent attempt to tie information-structural considerations into the characterization of 
the meaning of such sentences is made in van Fintel 1994. Drawing on Rooth's 1992 
anaphoric theory of focus, van Fintel assumes that a sentence such as (17a) contains· a 
number of elements, adjoined to the syntactic tree at particular places, which establish 
anaphoric links to operator domains within the same sentence or priot discourse. In 
particular, he adopts Rooth's "-" operator, by which an inaudible "focus anaphor" is 
attached to a syntactic constituent containing a focus. As a result, .the domain for the 
focus is then established by virtue of the fact that this focus anaphor has to find an 
antecedent. (within the same sentence or in prior discourse}, that is, determine a domain 
with particular properties determined by the meaning of the focused element. 13 Von 
·Fintel also proposes another operator, "=?', which attaches to a topic constituent and 
whose role it is to establish an anaphoric link to other possible predications over the topic 
(more precisely, a set of propositions in which something else is predicated over·the 
topic). As the logical form for sentences of the type in (17a), van Fintel then proposes the 
following (p. 62): 
ID As Jong·•• the topic precedes the constituent bearing the matching A accent, cf. 
A s· 
(i) '!'/Peter bestiindedieses Examen. 
B A 
Peter wiitde dieses Examen bestehen. 
11 This is the commonly used name for the syntactic material between the clause-initial position of finite 
verbs or complementizers and and the clause-final verb cluster in German clauses. · 
12 Gf. Engdahl and Vallduvr 1994:50 for similar observations regarding the flexibility in the implemention 
of informational structuring in Dutch. 
13 Cf. Fintel:38, where q> is a syntactic consti\uent, r a focus anaphor; and [[ ]] 0 denotes !he "ordinary" 
semantic value .of an expression and [[ )] f its "fo~us semantic" value, that is the set of all possible 
alternatives to the focussed constituent. 
(i) a [( q>-r no= [( q> J]O (no effect On assertion) 
b. [[ q>-r nf= ([[ q> 11°) (closing off focus) 
c. Presuppositions: I. [( r 11° i;; [[ tp Il f 
2.([tpilOe nrno 
3.3!;~e nrn&~ .. [[q>ll 
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(22) 
Pct«~ 
would haveuc S 
24 r----__ 
N~ -C24 
r---. ~ 
NP =C24 VF NP 
Ni(') I I 
passed that exam1 -e21 
Peter 
Here, the subscript uC24 on the quantificational operator, would have, states the restrictor 
part of the tripartite structure, whose modal forc.e is given as would have and whose 
nuclear scope is the entire sentence without the modal. As the modal operator's first 
argument, uC24 denotes the set .union of all the propositions picked out by the anaphor 
· C24, yielding the resource domain for the operator in terms of a set of situations. C24 in 
tum is constrained by the, presuppositions associated with its status as a topic anaphor 
correlated with the subject, Peter, and focus anaphor associated with the focused main 
verb passed. More specifically, the denotation of C24 will be a subset of the set of 
propositions of the form 'Peter q,s that exam.' According to Rooth's Alternative 
Semantics, this follows from the fact that the sentence contains a focused verb, passed, 
which contributes a variable meaning to the focus-semantic interpretation of the 
constituent that C24 syntactically adjoins to. As a result of the variable, the focus­
semantic value will not be a single proposition, but instead the set of propositions 
obtained by instantiating the variable with (alternative) values. The ordinary semantic 
value of C24 in turn is given as a subset of that set, as not all possible instai:itiations are 
admitted by the context. Accordingly, the set of situations that serves as the first 
argument of the modal operator, would have, will comprise a subset of those in which 
Peter q,s that exam, where von Fintel takes q, to range over pass/not pass. Moreover, note 
that Peter also bears a focus, which via the focus anaphor C21 evokes a set of 
contextually salient alternatives to Peter. Von Fintel suggests that we can plausibly 
assume this to be a set of people. However, C21 does not bear any focus-semantic import 
beyond the subject because once it combines with the NP, the focus-semantic value of the 
the resulting constituent will be closed off and prevented from percolating higher in the 
tree. Moreover, C21 does not occur elsewhere in the clause, say as the restrictor of an 
operator. On the other hand, C24 is also present in the subject NP as a topic anaphor 
(indicated by "="). 14 This establishes an anaphoric link to a set of propositions in which 
something is predicated of the topic-marked constituent. 
Thus, a paraphrase of von Fintel's logical form would be something like: "Given that 
we are talking about people, all hypothetical situations in which Peter passes or doesn't 
pass that exam are such that they can be extended to situations in which Peter passes that 
exam." Von Fintel assumc;s that the hypothetical part comes about via the presupposition 
14 Cf. the interpretation of the topic marking, given in Fintel:53: 
(i) a ([ <P"r ]]0 = [[ q, ]]0 (no effect on assertion) 
b. [[ <P"r Jif = [[ q, Jif (no affect on focus) 
c. Presuppositions: [[ r ]JO i; {p: 311.p= [[ q,] JO (11)) 
with n of the lowest type such that [[ q, ]] 0.(lt) or 11([[ q, )] 0 ) is of type t. 
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associated with would that the situations considered, i.e. those in the resource domain, 
have to be counterfactual. Since the domain of quantification consists of counterfactual 
passing as well as not-passing situations, the net effect is that in the actual world, Peter 
must neither have passed nor failed to pass the exam, which, according to von Fintel, 
requires that Peter did not even take the exam, i.e. that some of the preconditions for 
taking an exam are not given. · 
While von Fintel's account is· superior over Kasper's regarding virtually all of the 
shortcomings found earlier with the latter work, there are a number of deficiencies with 
this theory as well. The first is noticed by von Fintel himself (p. 54), as he points out that 
there is no guarantee that the set of propositions that a topic is required to be anaphoric to 
actually requires that the topic be a "constituent" of those propositions. Since there are in 
effect no requirements on the kinds of properties that are predicated of the topic in the 
discourse topic, there is nothing that rules oµt taking properties that map the topic into 
any arbitrary proposition. 
Further; note that while von Fintel's approach is an attempt to get away from rather 
"algorithmic", syntactic theories of how domains are retrieved from linguistic form (cf. 
e.g..Diesing 1990) towards a more pragmatically-based-One, it is not entirely clear what 
in his system ensures that focus anaphors such as his C24 in (22) are actually taken to 
identify the domain of the operator would have. Thus, ttiere is no mechanism, syntactic:or 
pragmatic, which would prevent this anaphor, and hence the informational structuring of 
the sentence, from being ignored by the operator. is · 
Another shortcoming is somewhat more subtle and pertains to the ·role of the 
contrastive topic in·'VOtl Fintel's logical form in (22) for simple subjunctive sentences. It 
appears that the occurrence of C24 as a topic anaphor has no bearing in determining the 
resource .domain for the modal operator, would have. To see this, ~all that the role of a 
topic-anaphor is to link the sentence to a discourse topic containing a set of predications 
over the topic. Thus, in.(22), the value of C24's occurrence as a topic anaphor is a subset 
of those propositions in which Peter does something. On the other·hand, the occurrence 
of C24 as a focus anaphor, adjoined to S, presupposes a salient set of propositions of the 
form 'Peter q,s that exam,' which is a stronger condition than, and hence supersedes, the 
presuppositional effect originating with the topic anaphor. If this is ~o. however, then the 
set of propositions that contribute the resource domain for the modal operator will be 
entirely determined by the focused verb, passed, and the focus anaphor C24, Note also, 
that the lowest focus anaphor, C21 ·only requires there to be a set of salient persons, but 
this set and the properties of these people have no bearing on the determination of the 
value for C2,4. What this means, though, is that the meaning of the ·sentence will, in its 
relevant aspects (i.e. the determination of the operator domain), come out to be precisely 
the same if the sentence does not contain a contrastive. topic marking on the subject as in 
our example in (17) above. Its representation within von Fintel's framework is given in 
(73): 
15 Similarly, there seem~·to be nothing that forces the topic ~naphor ·and the hi~her focus anaph~r to be 
identified as the same, C24, If Ibey were indeed different, there is no guarantee that ilieir respective 
antecedeni sets bear any relation to _each olher; 
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(23) 
s 
~
would havevei J-------____4 
N~ -C24 
Pe~r A 
VF NP 
I I 
passed that. exam 
This presents two problems for von Fintel's account. First, it makes the empirically 
wrong prediction that the particular kinds of interpretation found with simple 
subjunctives should also be possible if the sentence contains no prosodically marked 
contrastive topic. And second, even if it Were possible to get this kind of interpretation 
without such a topic, it remains a mystery what this kind of informational structuring 
adds to the interpretation of simple subjunctives of the type being considered here. 
5 Information Structure and Domain Restriction 
There is one very important respect in which von Fintel's account is qualitatively 
different from the approach pursued by Kasper. This is the idea that for an expression 
containing ·an operntor, the domain of that operator cannot be determined by confining 
one's consideration to that expression. Rather, a full account is only possible if one takes 
the pragmatic properties of the elements involved into account. Specifically, there is an 
intimate relationship between domain restriction and discourse. In von Fintel's theory this 
relationship is established by assimilating the behavior of focus/topic to that of anaphors. 
A rather different perspective suggests itself in the theory of pragmatics developed in 
Roberts 1995, which I summarize briefly below. 
One important metaphor in Roberts' theory is that of language as a game, which is a 
line of thought that goes back to Wittgenstein and has been brought to special 
prominence by Carlson 1983. This means that linguistic behavior, in particular the 
constituents of a discourse, can best be understood as the interaction of cooperative 
players trying· to attain certain goals, chief among them to arrive at a mutually agreed 
upon set of beliefs about the world, i.e. to maintain a common ground in the sense of 
Stalnaker 1979. Borrowing from Carlson 1983, Roberts takes the exchanges of the game 
to consist of moves governed by conversational and conventional constraints (or rules). 
Such moves consist of set-up moves such as questions and payoff moves such as 
assertions that serve as answers to previously introduced (and mutually accepted) 
questions. In order to attain a particular goal (i.e. to obtain a certain piece of information), 
a discourse participant pursues a strategy of inquiry which is implemented by a set of 
increasingly specific set-up moves. Such strategies, or, more accurately, the (temporal) 
sequence of set-up moves carrying out the strategy, together with the corresponding 
payoff moves constitute what Roberts calls the· infonnation structure of a discourse. 
Of central importance in this connection is the notion of question under discussion 
(QUD). A question under discussion-also referred to as the topic under discussion or 
the discourse topic-is essentially the most recent set-up move that the conversation 
participants have accepted and hence are committed to finding at least a partial answer 
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for. The semantic import of a question is to provide a set of alternatives; thus to 
(partially) answer a question is to exclude certain possibilities from consideration. 
Alternatively, instead of providing a direct answer via an assertion, an interlocutor may 
choose to introduce a more specific subquestion, i.e. set up a strategy of questions. Only 
if a move accomplishes one of these two possibilities is it deemed relevant to the 
question under discussion. Both options share the property of narrowing down the set of 
possibilities considered for what is taken to hold in the world. But while answers are 
choices among alternatives-ideally reflecting some discourse participant's state of 
knowledge of the world-'-a subquestion only brings into view the particular aspects of 
reality t_hat the current conversation is meant to elucidate with the understanding that 
more specific choices among the set of current alternatives may still be made. Ultimately, 
one can regard every question as a subquestion to what Roberts calls.the "Big Question", 
i.e. What is the way that things are? 
Crucially, some of the constraints on interpretation of an utterance can only be 
understood properly if the utterance is viewed in the context of the information structure 
of the preceding context, specifically, the current question under discussion. Any 
utterance must be relevant with respect to the latter in the sense mentioned before. 
However, it is not required that the discourse topic has to have been introduced by an 
overt question; i.e., often the question under discussion is only implicit in the discourse 
and hence discourse participants have to accomodate a plausible topic in light of a recent 
utterance. Consequently, a given utterance may not be associated with a unique question 
under discussion.16 
At this point, it is useful to give a simple example, along the Jines of Roberts 1_995, 
which also serves to illustrate a more formal characterization of. the relevant notions. 
Consider the discourse in (24): · 
(24) a. Who ate what? 
b.What did [Fred] eat? 
c. [Fred] ate [the beans]. 
In (24c), we have an utterance with two foci, the one on the subject being marked with a 
B accent while the object exhibits an A accent. These two foci give rise to what Roberts 
1995:18, following Rooth 1985, calls the focus alternative set: 
(25) The focus alternative set corresponding to a constituent p, II PII, is the set of all 
interpretations obtajned by replacing all the F-marked (focused) constituents in p 
with variables, and then interpreting the result relative to each memeber of the set of 
all assignment functions which vary at most in the values they assign to those 
variables. 
Accordingly, the focus alternative set of (24c) is as given in (26): 
(26) 11(24c)II = { p: :lu,v E D [ p = u ate v] ) 
That is, it is the set of propositions such that someone eats something in p. 
Now, we need to make explicit how the assertion in (24c) is part of the information 
structure of the whole discourse. To this end, we need to take a closer look at the aspect 
of the meaning of questions that is of immediate pragmatic relevance. Questions such as 
(24a) give rise to a set of propositions that constitute Q-alternatives. The definition of 
this notion is given in (27) from Roberts 1995: 13: 
16 See also Roberts and Kadmon 1986 on this point. 
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(27) The Q-alternatives corresponding to a clause a: 
Q-alt(a) = {p: (3ui-1,... , ui-n E D)[p = I~l(ui-1)... (ui-n)]), 
where: a has the logical form wh;.1, ... , wh;.n(~), 
with {wh;.1, ... , wh;.nJ the (possibly empty) set of wh-elements in a, and 
Dis the domain of the model for the language, suitably sortally restricted. 
Here, I ~I denotes the truthconditional meaning of an expression ~, i.e. a set of possible 
worlds, or, following Kratzer 1989, a set of situations. Basically, the Q-alternatives of a 
question provide all the possible propositions-cf. Hamblin 1973-from which an an 
answer, be it complete or partial, must be picked. Thus, we couldn't answer the question 
in (24a) with an utterance like It is raining outside. In fact, the Q-alternatives of a 
question a are the denotation of that question, as stated in (28): 
(28) !?al= Q-alt(a) 
The notions of focus alternatives and Q-alternatives are also important for ensuring 
cohesion among questions and answers in discourse. In particular, they are crucial for 
defining what it is for an utterance to be congruent to a question: 
(29) Move ~ is congruent to a question ?a iff its focal alternatives II ~II are the 
Q-alternatives determined by ?a, i.e. iff II ~II= Q-alt(a). 
In particular, we need to make sure that an utterance is congruent not to any arbitrary 
question, but, more specifically, to a question under discussion which the discourse is 
meant to address: 
(30) Presupposition of prosodic focus in an utterance*~ (assertion, question, imperative) 
~ is congruent to a question under discussion (in the information structure). 
Thus, the Q-alternative set of (24a) is as given in (31 ): 
(31) Q-alt((24a)) = { p: 3u,v E D [p = latel(u,v)] ) 
This set is precisely the same as the one in (26), hence (24c) is congruent to the question 
in (24a). 
Furthermore, I follow Roberts in assuming that in (24), (24c) is not simply an answer 
to (24a). Rather, the prosodic asymmetry between the B-accented subject and the A­
accented object seems to indicate that in answering (24a), a certain strategy of inquiry is 
involved that employs the subquestion in (24b). Logically, the question under discussion 
entails the subquestion because the set of all complete answers to the first includes the set 
of all complete answers to the second (see Roberts 1995 for discussion). The set of all 
complete answers to the question under discussion sets up a partition on the context set. 
To illustrate, Jet us assume that we have a model with two people, Fred and Bill, and two 
edible substances, beans and rice. Then one complete answer to the question in (24a) 
would be as follows: 
(32) a. Fred ate the beans. 
b.Fred did not eat the rice. 
c.Bill did not eat the beans. 
d.Bill ate the rice. 
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Any other possible combination constitutes a different complete answer. Only one 
combination may hold in a given world. Conversely, we can take the worlds in which one 
complete answer holds to constitute and equivalence class which does not intersect with 
the set of worlds in which any other combination of values for the eating relation holds. 
In this sense, the Q-altematives of the question under discussion establish a partition on 
the context set. However, answers are rarely complete; thus, a rather than a run· 
accounting of how the world is with respect to a certain question under discussion, we 
often have to be content with partial answers. An answer is partial if it excludes at least 
one equivalence class from· the set of all complete answers. Thus, (32a) is a partial 
· answer because it removes from the context set all those worlds in which Fred did not eat 
the beans. But this for instance still leaves Fred's status with respect to the rice 
unresolved, Note also that any complete answer is also partial, but not vice versa. 
How does the foregoing help to shed some light on the problem at hand, i.e. the 
interpretation of simple subjunctives? A sentence such as the one in (17a), I claim, can 
only be dealt with adequately if we consider it as an answer to the question under 
discussion. In particular, because of the distribution of accents, we also have to assume 
that there is a particular strategy of inquiry that this sentence is to address. 
(33) a. Who bears what relation to the exam? 
b.What relation does :i>eter bear to the exam? 
c. [Peter] [would have passed] the exam. 
One important assumption is that the accent on passed is taken to indicate broad focus in 
the sense that the modal is part of the constituent replaced by variables in the 
determination of the focus alternative set. Consequently, this set will contain propositions 
in which Peter bears a "real" relation to the exam (eg., he takes it and passes/flunks) as 
well as those in which what I .will refer to as "modal relations" hold. This means that in.a 
given world w, it may not even make sense to wonder about Peters passing/failing of said 
exam because·the presuppositions are not met in such a world (for instance, if he never 
took the exam in that world). But that still leaves open the possibility that Peter bears a 
modal relation to the exam, for instance, that he might have passed it. In other words, if 
we consider the worlds that are modally accessible from w, it may not be excluded that 
Peter passes the exam in ·such worlds. A relevant answer to the question in (33a,b) will 
then be one that excludes at least one cell in the partition set up by the Q-alternatives to 
(33a). As a consequence of allowing modal relations, it follows that there can never be a 
complete answer, in Roberts' sense, as there is an infinitude of.possible modal relations 
which no answer can exhaustively specify. At first this seems to raise a problem. Since 
any mqdal relation contributes a partial answer, and hence ensures congruence in 
Roberts' sense, why could the would-counterfactual not be interpreted with any implicit 
antecedent? That is, if the requirement of congruence does not supply a constraint on 
what hypothetical worlds/situations are under discussion, why don't'speakers accomodate 
antecedents at random. For instance, in (33c), if the accomodated antecedent were if the 
Moon were made of green·cheese, the resulting conditional should count ·as a legitimate 
congruent answer as it supplies a modal relation. In other words, any simple subjunctive 
with an unexpressed antecedent will vacuously supply ·an answer; 17 
The solution to this problem, I want to argue, cannot be found by considering only the 
relationship between the elements of the strategy of inquiry in (33). Rather', it is ·necessary 
to realize that the initial question under discussion is a subquestion which in tum serves 
to address a superordinate discourse topic. For the case at hand, this more general 
17 If this is correct, it suggests that th~ situation with modals is rather different from that of or,ly. As is 
discussed by Roberts, the proper domain restriction for focus-sensitive elements such as only does not have 
to be stipulated, but can be deduced fairly directly by considering which choices will yield answers that are 
relevant for answering the question under discussion. · 
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question involves a comparison between the brothers in terms of their scholastic abilities. 
To make matters concrete, we may take this comparison to be verbalized by means of a 
question such as in (34). 
(34) Are you as good as your brother? 
This in turn means that answers to the question, what relation does Peter bear to the 
exam? will indeed be subject to the requirement that they be of relevance, not only for the 
immediate question under discussion, but also for the initially raised question. Hence, 
only if we accomodate an antecedent for the simple subjunctive which addresses the issue 
of comparison will the resulting conditional yield a relevant answer. An antecedent in 
which one brother hypothetically takes the place of the other is the most straightforward 
way to arrive at the required comparison. By contrast, if instead an antecedent such as if 
the Moon were made of green cheese were chosen, no relevant partial answer would 
emerge. 
This view fits straightforwardly into a theory of counterfactuals such as Kratzer .I 98 J. 
There, it is assumed that counterfactuals involve an empty modal base f and a totally 
realistic ordering source, g. If pis the antecedent of a counterfactual then this means that 
the modal base is determined directly as the set of worlds in which p is true. Given p, 
having a totally realistic ordering source entails that "all possible worlds in which the 
antecedent p is true are ordered with respect to their being more or Jess near to what is 
actually the case in the world under consideration" (Kratzer I 981 :69). Taken by 
themselves, these conditions do not say much if p is implicit-that is, they will not be 
sufficient to restrict the range of possible antecedents p. But this is where superordinate 
considerations of relevance come into play. The sentence can only make a relevant 
contribution to the question under discussion-that is the issue of comparison between 
different protagonists-if the accomodated antecedent allows us to make a statement 
about the person in question, viz. Peter. This in turn minimally requires that the 
accomodated antecedent provide the presuppositions of the consequent. The totally 
realistic ordering source ensures that those worlds in the set are ranked higher which 
conform in more ways to what the actual world looks like. 
The conversational background plays an important role in determining whether the 
accomodation of the implicit antecedent is local or global. The scenario that was 
introduced in the beginning of this paper is only one of a number of possibilities in which 
a sentence like (J7a) could be uttered. In each case, though, we can safely assume that 
what is accomodated in the hypothesized antecedent will at the very least supply the 
presuppositions for the consequent. Thus, if it is part of the background information that 
John flunked the exam while Peter 11ever took it, then the. sentence in ( 17a) will require 
accomodation of situations in which the presuppositions of passing are satisfied, i.e. in 
which Peter takes the exam. In this case, then, the accomodated situation_s of Peter taking 
the exam all involve strictly local accomodation. That is to say, hearers cannot globally 
accomodate this proposition as it would lead to a conflict with what is known about the 
real world. But this doesn't always have to be so. According to the Principle of Optimal 
Realism proposed by Roberts 1994: I 8, accomodation may indeed be global-in fact, this 
is the default case: 
(35) Principle of optimal realism: 
[ ... ] we make the default assumption that counterfactual contexts are as much like 
the actual world as is compatible with what's explicitly said about them. 
This principle entails that accomodated presuppositions are taken to hold at the highest 
level compatible with what's known about the actual world.·Hence, if they are in conflict 
with the actual world, accomodation is only local. Otherwise, it will be global. Among 
other things, this predicts that a sentence like (17a) should in principle allow readings in 
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which global accomodation takes place. Suppose, for instance, that the sentence in ( 17a) 
is uttered against the backdrop of what may have been the case if the thunderstorm that 
hit Columbus and threw everything into disarray for a few days and kept students from 
studying had not occurred. In this case, the QUD would be something along the following 
lines: 
(36). Who bears what relation to the exam under the premise of there not being a 
thunderstorm? , 
a.John (still) would have flunked the exam. 
b.Peter would have passed the exam. 
In other words, in a context of the appropriate kind, a sentence like (35b) can very well 
be interpreted as part of a larger strategy of inquiry which itself is hypothetical in nature. 
But when there is nothing known about the real world that is incompatible with Peter's 
taking said exam, this information can be accomodated and moreover, this accomodation 
is global. 
How does the kind of contrast effect perceived with the B-A intonation fit into this 
picture? What I want to suggest is that this not "hard-wired" into the conventional 
meaning of this type of prosody, but instead a pragmatic effect. In particular, it can be 
seen as a result of a conversational implicature. Note that lack of prosodic prominence or 
deaccenting conveys such material is assumed to be part of what is already salient in 
discourse or what can generally be taken to be already known to the conversation 
participal)ts. On the other hand, lack of deaccenting, i.e. prosodic prominence has the 
effect of highlighting something what counts as novel in comparison with what is in the 
common ground. Seen in that light, the A accent in examples such as (36b) marks the 
current statement as different in one respect or another from whatever else is explicitly or 
implicitly part of the strategy of inquiry being pursued. In the specific case of (36b ), this 
gives rise to the implicature that Peter's fate is judged as novel in comparison with that of 
some other person who has either been made salient in previous discourse or whose 
existence and concomitant relation to the exam is accomodated. If, on the other hand, the 
utterance conveyed nothing novel in light of the kind of relation borne to the exam in 
question made salient in previous discourse, an A accent would be infelicitous as there is 
a more informative way of conveying the information. Specifically, this is the function of 
too, which links a given statement to information already part of the common ground. 
(37) [PeterJwould have passed the exam, too. 
Note, incidentally, that with narrow focus on the modal, we can directly induce a 
comparison among different types of modal relations: 
(38) [Peter] [would] have passed the exam. 
A scenario that will make uttering such an example felicitous is one in which (given 
some hypothetical circumstance, for instance of having had more sleep the night before) 
it has already been determined that, say, John might have passed the exam, but the 
possibility of failure, even under these more advantageous circumstances, cannot be ruled 
out. In Peter's case, on the other hand, the possibility of failure is not deemed an option. 
6 .Conclusion 
There is obviously much more that could be said about the accomodation of antecedents 
for simple subjunctives. The basic picture that has been emerging from the work of von 
Fintel is clear, namely that explicit interpretation rules for simple subjunctives such as the 
ones proposed by Kasper are neither necessary nor sufficient. Instead, it seems that the 
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range of accomodated antecedents is largely predictable by the kinds of constraints that 
govern accomodation in general, that is the pragmatic component. While von Fintel's 
approach attempts to assimilate accomodation to anaphoric reference-in particular to 
presupposed discourse topics, Roberts'. perspective allows-us to view the phenomenon 
from a more general and encompassing vantage point. For contributions to a conversation 
to be felicitous, they need to be able to further the interlocutors' knowledge of the way 
that things are in a nonrandom fashion. Clearly, simple subjunctives are no exception and 
the suggestions made here indicate that they can be shown to fit the patterns of coherence 
and informativeness if we allow for a more abstract notion of topic under discussion. 
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